History and Semiotics by Passerini, Luisa
   





  History and Semiotics
Passerini Luisa  
http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/historein.123
 
  Copyright © 2012 Luisa Passerini 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Passerini, L. (2000). History and Semiotics. Historein, 1, 13-20. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/historein.123




In this text history is attributed a double 
meaning: it is conceived as what has 
happened in the past and, also, the cognition 
of what has happened. However, this double 
meaning does not coincide exactly with the 
old distinction between res gestae and 
h istoria rerum gestarum. Res gestae, i.e., 
what happened in the past, is not only no 
longer conceived as a totality, but, in the 
perspective of a semiotised history (historia 
sub specie semioticae), it is conceived as 
itself a communicative process. In this 
sense, the course of history is the process of 
generation of new expressions in a certain 
language and their understanding by society, 
whereby new information obtains diverse 
reactions from the collective entity 
(Uspenskij). Language must be understood 
here not in a strict, literal sense, but in a wide, 
semiotic one. In Uspenskij's definition, the 
text of events is read and interpreted by 
society, acquiring a meaning shared by the 
collective whole. Whatever is not described 
by this "language" is not perceived by 
society, as if it were not visible. 
Such semiotisation of history, inherent in 
historical perception, transforms the objects 
it perceives into historical events. At this 
point, it might appear that the separation 
between res gestae and historia rerum 
gestarum is more nuanced than it would be if 
the two processes were thought of as 
pertaining to different orders of reality. 
Historia rerum gestarum is made possible by 
and based on the textual nature of res gestae: 
recurrences and patterns present in the text 
of passed history condition or resist 
interpretations from the present. At the same 
time, the textual reading of new historians 
reformulates the past as a text. This does not 
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imply that the whole past is reduced to acts of wording; the connection with other aspects-from 
emotional drives to economic forces-is a horizon that history can never lose sight of, although 
it is not the direct object of its exercise. 
Semiotisation of history as we understand it opposes the structuralist definition of history as an 
amorphous myriad of psychic and individual movements that, in the end, could be resolved into 
cerebral, hormonal, nervous, i.e. physical or chemical, phenomena (Lévi-Strauss). This type of 
structuralism reduced history to a pulverisation of infinitesimal events, to which only the subjective 
choices of the historian intervened to give some sense. "Subjectivity" was therefore casual and 
arbitrary, since it could not find any correspondence in the patternless complex of apparently 
identical entities, devoid of any specific human character. Only if the historical process (res 
gestae) is conceived of as the product not only of physical and chemical determinations, but also 
of acts of decision and understanding-a text including stories about a partial and conditioned 
freedom-only then can the subjectivity of historical choices in historia rerum gestarum show its 
whole strength as a new understanding with the past, a dialogue that was not possible before and 
has become possible now thanks to the development of new languages. 
Plurality and discontinuity of history conceived as a communicative process 
One of the characteristic aspects of historiographical attitudes in the last half century, and 
particularly in the last twenty years, is the insistence on plurality: of choices, of objects, of 
methodologies. This implies giving up any illusion of studying history as a totality or by a total 
approach; on the contrary, the historical attitude always requires choices. "Since the 1960s, all 
the regnant absolutisms of the XIX century have been dethroned" (Appleby et al.). The 
awareness has grown of history as a relentless making of choices, where each choice implies 
the responsibility of the historian, both in a professional and a moral sense (Kula). It is as part 
of this attitude that recent historiography, even when it assumes as its object "the world", has 
given up claims to totality. Wallerstein reminds us that the very term "world" changed its 
meaning from 1450 to 1650, and justifies its usage on the basis of the insufficiency of terms 
like "state", "national society", and "social system". "World" is therefore to be taken as a 
simplificatory concept that allows one to deal with certain historical realities, for example, states 
as unities within other unities. It is a unitarian concept, but not in an absolute sense; rather, it is 
historically dated, referring primarily to that type of world economy that originated in Europe in 
the nineteenth century. 
At the same time, the debate about "microhistory" has indicated that the definition of what is 
relevant to history is not a matter of scale; on the contrary, it depends on the very conception 
of history. This may be shown by one example coming precisely from the debate over 
microhistory, i.e. the work by Robert Darnton on the great cat massacre. For Lévi-Strauss 
history was a discontinuous ensemble of different zones, each defined by its own frequency and 
different code of time. This assertion might be taken as the basis for justification of one of the 
most interesting forms of history that has appeared in the last decades, microhistory, if 
microhistory were understood in a postmodern perspective as evidence of the pulverisation of 
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history and the weakness of any generalisation. We prefer an interpretation that stresses the 
ambivalence of microhistory. It is true that, on the one hand, it flirts with postmodernism, 
showing the contradictions between the general and the particular as well as inverting the 
hierarchies in the relationship between the two. On the other hand, microhistory can be a serious 
challenge to traditional ways of defining that relationship and of understanding the historical 
process and its internal connections. 
When Robert Darnton studies the great massacre of cats that took place at the end of the third 
decade of the eighteenth century, he justifies how one can study his object with the same spirit 
as one could study the Discours préliminaire of the Encyclopédie. On the level of general theory, 
Darnton eludes the question, inviting readers to enjoy the trip, and thereby stressing the skill of 
the historian, able to master his style as well as relationships with other disciplines, like 
anthropology. But, within the narration, after having brilliantly described the Sabbath where the 
workers submit to trial and condemn to death many cats, including one beloved by the wife of 
their employer, Darnton expresses general judgments of great relevance. He maintains that, in 
submitting to trial, condemning and hanging a crowd of cats, the workers were pillorying the 
whole juridical and social order, and that, half a century later, the artisans of Paris would have 
acted in a very similar way with trials and massacres. What is implied is that an antecedent on 
the symbolic plane may have meaning even for facts of another nature and relevance. The 
"zone" of history—to use Lévi-Strauss's word-studied by Darnton, however "small", can have 
meaning and relevance for another zone, however "big" it could be considered. And it takes its 
meaning not only from its past, containing beliefs concerning witches and animals, but also 
from its future, containing nothing less than the Great Revolution. 
Darnton's operation is a textual one that challenges openly the hierarchies of relevance normally 
accepted by historians. Thanks to the new language that it develops, the operation creates a new 
text, establishing new continuities in history. Where one could see only atomisation, separation, 
and difference, now we can detect links and relations. If the definition of history as a 
discontinuous ensemble appears too narrow, equally inadequate would be the opposite, 
assuming a total continuity as a feature of history. The exclusive insistence on continuity would 
actually reproduce the idea of a whole composed of identical elementary particles, whereas by 
introducing quality into the historical process-as one inevitably does by comparing it to a text-
discontinuity is also introduced. Among 
the structural characters of the historical 
process one should in fact include break, 
death, and change of a radical kind, as the 
famous metaphor by Walter Benjamin, the 
angel struck by a storm, reminds us 
powerfully. 
Plurality has to be understood as 
including the possibility of radical change. 
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It is not by chance that a thinker like Hannah Arendt, thoughtful of the importance of freedom in 
history, has insisted on this. For her, plurality has something to do with the definition of history 
as a public sphere, where newborn spheres appear all the time. The new generations innovate 
the course of history-and, we could add, its languages-bringing new subjects and new 
discourses to the forefront. 
The multiplication of the subjects (in the double sense of "topics" and "agents") of 
history is a relevant feature of the trend toward plurality: they have given rise to a 
series of new forms of history, such as women's history, black history, gay history, 
chicano history, asserting the dignity and the subjectivity of many who had not 
been seen as historical until very recently. This type of plurality is a condition of 
historical knowledge as the possibility to make historiographical choices, change 
past priorities, enlarge the "territory of the historian" on the one hand, and on the 
other stress the subjectivity of any historiographical research. At the same time, the 
conceptual categories introduced by these new forms of history have radically 
altered the historiographical act: "gender" as a way of understanding women and 
men of the past has brought awareness of the changing historical nature of 
subjectivity in the course of historical time. 
Subjectivity has been recognised as a source of history-as well as of the so-called 
hard sciences-in a twofold way. First of all it is empirical subjectivity, having to do 
with one single individual to whom it dictates or suggests choices of various 
nature; on this basis, one could build an interesting ego-histoire of many historians 
and find there illuminating aspects of their relationships with their epochs as well 
as of the unique features of their personalities. Second, however, it is a type of 
collective subjectivity, accumulated through practices of historians in their travels 
through documents. These practices include techniques and methods shared by 
historians of many generations, for example the critique of sources and the 
reference to disciplines which change according to the research, from philology to 
anthropology, statistics, law, etc. According to Kracauer, they also include what he 
calls "historical ideas", i.e. interpretations of historical processes that seem to go further than 
the material from which they have been deduced. Among such hypotheses Kracauer lists the 
concept of Renaissance as affirmation of the individual in the sense of Burckhardt, as well as 
the theory of the relationship between structure and superstructure as proposed by Marx. 
Historical ideas are not generalisations, but intuitions, with roots in the facts, which however are 
not the only basis of their validity. They are universals, whose objectivity is due precisely to their 
being openly and actively subjective. 
These considerations are a useful background to the debate on the Renaissance, an idea 
"invented", as Lucien Febvre used to say, by Michelet. Peter Burke has argued that many 
renaissances have existed, and has followed Toynbee in writing the word with a small "r", in 
order to underline the continuities between that phenomenon and other similar ones in the 
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middle ages; thus the Renaissance changes proportions and is considered more as a movement 
than as a period, characterised by the effort to give new life to antiquity. Here too, the refusal to 
accept the simple opposition between the Renaissance and the middle ages indicates that the 
challenges posed by structuralism have been accepted in a positive way, by recognising the 
complexity and multiplicity of history, rather than in a negative way, by negating continuity in 
favor of a total pulverisation of the historical process. The recognition of spaces of maneuver, 
decision and freedom, even if intermingled with forms of moral and material determination, is 
crucial to this approach. 
The critique by Burke is convergent with the one that the feminist historian Joan Kelly has made 
of the idea of the Renaissance understood as a general and omnicomprehensive historical 
horizon. Kelly, posing the provocative question of whether women ever had a Renaissance, has 
given a negative reply, since the progress of law, economy, and customs that took place 
between the fifteenth and seventeenth century was not coupled with a corresponding progress 
of women's conditions, defined on the basis of reproductive functions and family roles. From 
all this, Kelly deduced the limits of the historians' operations; she did not, however, deny their 
validity, but rather argued that they are circumscribed and conditioned. 
The insistence on plurality is very relevant to our understanding of history as a communicative 
process. Without plurality—of subjects, of cultures, of areas-history could not be at the same 
time continuous and discontinuous, allowing both freedom and determination. Plurality is the 
basis for languages and texts of various sorts, for dialogues and interpretations that keep 
changing with the passing of time. Hannah Arendt derives from Kafka the metaphor of the 
present as a lacuna between past and future which human beings keep open by their efforts, 
forcefully pushing back the pressure of the past as well as resisting the pressure of the future. 
Only in this lacuna can there be space for the discourse of history and the discourses on history. 
A long way to go 
The nature of history as a communicative process is shown at its best by the recent 
developments that have seen many social historians (let us remember that social history had 
become since the 1960s the most important area of research in history) become increasingly 
interested in the history of culture, a shift already present in Edward P. Thompson's work on The 
Making of the English Working Class. The step 
forward was to be the criticism addressed to 
Thompson for the direct relationship he 
established between social being and social 
consciousness, the sort of criticism that 
Stedman Jones raised in connection with the 
need to understand and analyse the "discursive 
nature" of political language and not simply its 
correspondence to the supposed consciousness 
of a particular social group (Hunt). 
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An increasing distance from the materialist reductionism of both Marxism and the Annales 
school brought history closer and closer not only to anthropology, but to literary criticism, 
philosophy, and linguistics. Alongside came the increasing realisation that a history of culture 
cannot be reduced to the product of economic and social transformations nor, at the same time, 
can it be made to return to a world of ideas cut totally free of them (O'Brien). The emphasis on 
the literary dimension of social experience and the literary structure of historical writing 
expanded historical scholarship beyond its traditional limits, reaching the conclusion that history 
can never be entirely separated from literature or philosophy or other disciplinary languages, 
although it can never be identical to those other discourses (Kramer). 
The suggestion has come forward that these tendencies still have not been brought far enough, 
due to the traditional character of the historical discipline so largely linked to hegemonic relations 
within the profession. However, many significant declarations as well as important works by well 
known historians have gone in this direction. Just to take a few examples, Natalie Zemon Davis 
has evinced the fictional aspects of sources such as the royal letters of pardon and remission in 
seventeenth century France, "fictional" meaning here the forming, shaping and molding of 
elements, i.e. the crafting of a narrative. Davis has brilliantly shown that the rules for plot in the 
judicial tales interacted with wider contemporary habits of explanation, description, and 
evaluation, and that the capacity of invention was widely distributed in all social classes and 
throughout society, where it held an essential role: by turning an action into a story 
people could take some distance from it and come to terms with it. 
Roger Chartier has built his interpretation of cultural history on a redefinition of 
the process of representation, studied through the interconnected practices that 
constitute it. That history comes to be understood as a series of relationships 
between discursive forms of cultural appropriation and differentiated 
interpretations. This approach significantly implies a rediscussion of the 
relationship between representation and the represented, the sign and the 
signified, as it was understood in the classical theory of signs of ancien régime 
society; in so doing, Chartier attempts to comprehend representations in 
connection with a plurality of differentiated practices and contrasted uses. 
Simon Schama has deliberately reproposed the form of eighteenth century 
chronicles, following a chronological scheme that he defines as "out of fashion". 
For him, this form of narration intentionally corresponds to the way in which 
actors of history constructed events as they saw their actions in between models 
of a heroic past and expectations of future generations. In positioning his own 
narrative, Schama takes care to differentiate it from previous ones: for instance, 
in relationship to Tocqueville, his story presents itself more as a testimony than 
as a judgement, while listening in a similar way to the voices of citizens whose 
lives it wants to describe. Therefore, Schama concludes, to the authority of the 
traditional form of historical narrative, he prefers the chaos of authenticity. 
\-**{ 
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These are narrative choices which have become more clear within the background debate 
between history and literary criticism, the latter acting as a theory of culture for our times. To 
what extent history has gone all the way in the direction indicated by theory is of course 
debatable. Much has been done in terms of a critical understanding of historical attitudes, such 
as the reformulation of the history of historical thought since the nineteenth century in terms of 
discourses and modes of argument, e.g. the seminal work on Metahistory by Hayden White. But 
results in actual historical production-such as the ones we have cited before-are scattered in a 
vast landscape of traditional attitudes, remnants of positivistic thought, and fear of innovation. 
This is particularly true of the institutional aspects of history, like the organisation of historical 
knowledge in university departments, and its subdivision in chairs, doctorates, steps of 
academic careers, etc. By and large, these still reflect a conception of history prior to semiotics, 
as a reflection of what happened in the past, which in turn is sometimes confined, at least in 
some countries, to events before World War II. 
Some years before Metahistory was published, White had reproached historians for their timidity 
and ambivalence, and their lack of willingness to participate in the general intellectual and artistic 
life of their times, which he attributed to their shyness in using modes of representation from the 
scientific and artistic domains. These nays, many argue that history has gone too far on the road 
of even hosting talk of representations and subjectivity, to the expense of other types of research. 
We would argue, in stark contrast, that much is left to be done in order to draw out the full 
consequences of a semiotic conception of history as a communicative process. If the 
restlessness of history is the same as the restlessness of the time that weighs "on our hearts and 
spirits," then the "fragile art of writing history," as Braudel put it, is a relevant piece of the puzzle 
of culture today. The development of a semiotics of history might be the essential step that 
historians have to take in order to assume their role on the cultural scene of the present. 
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